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Rethinking Mistake in the Age of Algorithms: Quoine
Pte Ltd v B2C2 Ltd
Vincent Ooi* and Kian Peng Soh
Good traders remove emotion from the decision-making process. Automated trading
algorithms have enabled this, allowing one to trade round the clock, and without the
constant need to monitor one’s investments. But software has gremlins. Given the
vast amounts of money involved in such trades, it was only a matter of time before dis-
putes involving automated trading software came before the courts. The decision in
Quoine v B2C2 (‘Quoine’)1 represents the first time an apex court in the Commonwealth
has ruled on the applicability of contractual principles to situations involving automated
trading software.
Central to the dispute were several trades executed between B2C2 Ltd (the ‘Respon-
dent’) and the counterparties on the trading platform operated by Quoine Pte Ltd (the
‘Appellant’). These trades were all executed via automated trading algorithms. The
counterparties and the Appellant were unaware as to the specific terms on which the
contracts were concluded.2 To place an order on the exchange, the Respondent’s algor-
ithm first had to generate an ‘output price’. The generation was done by first obtaining
data of the 20 best sell or buy orders from the Platform’s order book, being one of the
variables for the series of trading strategies contained within the Respondent’s algorithm.
Without data from the Platform, the Respondent’s algorithm would cease to work.
Seeking to pre-empt this, Mr Boonen, a director of the Respondent, inserted a ‘virtual
price’ of 10 BTC to 1 ETH for sell orders for ETH. The ‘virtual price’ would apply if
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there was no or insufficient input from the Platform, enabling the Respondent’s algor-
ithm to continue running.
As things transpired, this was exactly what happened. Because of an oversight, the
Appellant’s market-making programme could not access external market prices from
other exchanges. ETH/BTC orders were not created on the Platform. However,
because no error message was generated, this went unnoticed. Trading on the Platform
fell to abnormally thin levels. This triggered margin calls on the Counterparties’
accounts. Consequently, market orders were placed on their behalf to buy ETH at the
best available market price which happened to be that offered by the Respondent.
Because the Platform was not configured to check whether the Counterparties had
sufficient funds in their account, the Counterparties were allowed to trade more BTC
than they had in their account, and at abnormally high prices. The Appellant reversed
these trades on grounds that they represented an abnormal deviation from the previous
BTC/ETH rate. The Respondent sued the Appellant for (a) breach of contract, alleging
that they had no right to unilaterally reverse the trades and (b) breach of trust, alleging
that the Appellant had unilaterally removed BTC from its account after reversing the
trades.
The case came before Thorley IJ in the Singapore International Commercial Court
(‘SICC’) at first instance in the case of B2C2 Ltd v Quoine Pte Ltd (‘B2C2’).3 Respond-
ing to the Respondent’s claim, the Appellant argued that it was entitled to reverse the
trades on grounds: (1) of terms implied in the ‘Terms and Conditions’ stated on their
website, and/or (2) of express terms in the agreement governing use of the Platform
read in conjunction with the risk disclosure statement on its website. It further argued
that the contracts were void or voidable under the doctrine of (3) unilateral mistake at
common law; (4) unilateral mistake in equity; (5) mutual mistake; and/or (6) unjust
enrichment.
All six defences were rejected. Thorley IJ held that the Appellant could not reverse
the trades on the basis of express or implied terms. Further, the doctrine of unilateral
mistake at common law or equity did not void the contracts. There was no knowledge
on the part of the programmer, Mr Boonen, as to the mistake. The doctrine of mutual
mistake also did not apply to the present case. Finally, there was no unjust enrichment.
On appeal, substantially the same arguments were mounted but found no favour
with the majority in the Court of Appeal, which affirmed Thorley IJ’s decision. The
majority affirmed Thorley IJ’s characterisation of the contractual relationships; that
the Trading Contracts were formed directly between the Respondent and the Counter-
parties as this accorded with the terms of the agreement governing use of the Platform.4
Moreover, the majority also affirmed Thorley IJ’s finding that the Appellant was not
entitled to cancel the disputed trades on the basis of express or implied terms.5
3 B2C2 Ltd v Quoine Pte Ltd [2019] 4 SLR 17.
4 Quoine, [50]–[55].
5 Quoine, [61]–[62], [74]–[77].
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Dealing next with the Appellant’s defence of unilateral mistake, the majority held
that because the Respondent’s software was not coded with the intention of taking
advantage of a mistaken bid by a counterparty, the doctrine of unilateral mistake at
common law did not apply.6 The Appellant’s defence of common mistake also failed
because the Respondent’s deliberate programming of the virtual prices of ETH/BTC
meant that they were not mistaken as to price. Having found that there was no unilateral
or common mistake, the Appellant’s claim of unjust enrichment also failed. There could
not have been unjust enrichment given that the Respondent’s windfall was the result of
valid contracts. The sole dissent came from Lord Mance who disagreed with the majority
on the application of the doctrine of unilateral mistake. In Lord Mance’s view, the claim
that the transactions were voidable for unilateral mistake in equity should have suc-
ceeded and he would have allowed the appeal.7
The majority disagreed with Thorley IJ on the issue of whether a trust had been
created, holding that, even assuming that BTC could be the subject of a trust, there
was no trust created over the BTC in the Respondent’s account. Although Thorley IJ
had ruled that cryptocurrencies were property, the majority declined to express a definite
opinion, holding instead that the breach of trust claim failed because there was no cer-
tainty of intention.8
OBSERVATIONS
The majority began their analysis by defining the type of trading software employed by
the Respondent as deterministic. Such software would ‘always produce precisely the
same output given the same input’9 and did not have the capacity to develop its own
responses to varying conditions. The majority also noted that while legislative interven-
tion to regulate algorithmic trading might eventually be appropriate, they considered
that the existing body of law could be adapted to deal with such cases at the moment.10
Both the majority and Lord Mance agreed that the case before them was not one of
unilateral mistake at common law.11 However, the Singapore position, which differs
from that in England, recognises the doctrine of unilateral mistake in equity.12 This
requires (a) that the non-mistaken party have constructive notice of the error, (b) the
presence of sharp practice or unconscionable conduct and (c) an element of impropriety
before equitable jurisdiction could be invoked to set aside the contract.13 While the
6 Quoine, [123].
7 Quoine, [207].
8 Quoine, [144].
9 Quoine, [15]. ‘Input’ in this context should be taken in a broad sense to include the surrounding con-
ditions under which the software is operating.
10 Quoine, [79].
11 Quoine, [114]–[116] (see Lord Mance at [182]).
12 Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2005] 1 SLR(R) 502, [74].
13 Ibid, [77].
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majority and Lord Mance were in agreement that the doctrine of unilateral mistake was
applicable to cases involving automated trading algorithms,14 they parted ways as to the
manner in which it was to be applied.
The first point of disagreement related to the element of constructive knowledge.
The majority held the view that the relevant knowledge was that of the programmer
or person running the programme, and it was to be assessed from the point of program-
ming up to the point where the contract was formed.15 This was because there could be
situations where the mistake was not contemplated at the point of programming but
came to mind later, before the contract was formed.16 In doing so, the court rejected
the Appellant’s argument that equity should intervene based on a review of the reason-
ableness of the ensuing contract after its formation without any mistake as to its terms.17
Therefore, the key inquiry was whether the non-mistaken party ought to have known of
the type of mistake and acted to take advantage of it.18
In contrast, Lord Mance opined that it did not matter whether the non-mistaken
party had assumed knowledge of the mistake at the time of the transactions or ‘prophe-
tically in advance’.19 Relief should be available once it would ‘have been perceived that
some fundamental error had occurred’.20 According to Lord Mance, this would parallel
situations of actual knowledge rather than constructive notice.21 The reason for this
modified approach was that in typical cases of unilateral mistake, the enquiry focussed
on ‘the actual state of mind and conduct of human beings involved in the making of the
contract’.22 However, this was an impossible enquiry in the context of contracts formed
between two automated trading algorithms. That said, where contracts are concluded
entirely by algorithms, it may still be possible to determine knowledge on the part of
the contracting parties to allow the operation of the doctrine of mistake. As the majority
pointed out, this knowledge can be determined by assessing the state of mind of the pro-
grammer or the person running the programme.23
Finally, both the majority and Lord Mance discussed how the element of uncon-
scionable conduct might apply. The majority held that unconscionable conduct was a
requirement for establishing unilateral mistake in equity in the present case24 and,
citing the decision in BOM v BOK,25 preferred a narrower conception of unconscion-
ability, arguing that it ‘limits excessive subjectivity in determining what amounts to
14 Quoine, [97], [193].
15 Quoine, [99].
16 Quoine, [99].
17 Quoine, [104].
18 Quoine, [102]–[103].
19 Quoine, [194].
20 Ibid.
21 Quoine, [178].
22 Quoine, [185].
23 Quoine, [99].
24 Quoine, [109].
25 BOM v BOK [2019] 1 SLR 349.
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unconscionable conduct, and instead promotes certainty and predictability for contract-
ing parties’.26
Lord Mance drew a distinction between two forms of unconscionability: (1) uncon-
scionability in bringing about the transaction; and (2) unconscionability in retaining the
benefit of the transaction. According to Lord Mance, given that the present case required
the modified approach, there was no role for the first type of unconscionability.27
Rather, he focused on the second type of unconscionability, stating that it would be
unconscionable for a trader to retain the benefit of transactions once he knew that
they were the result of some major error.28
This distinction is reflected in the various points made in Lord Mance’s dissent.
First, he pointed out that the present situation was one where the primary vitiating
factor relied on was mistake and in that context, unconscionability is a ‘pre-requisite
to equitable relief’.29 Second, he took the view that there can never be constructive
notice if one understands unconscionable behaviour ‘based on knowledge by the non-
mistaken party as behaviour conducing to the mistaken party remaining mistaken’.30
Therefore, in cases where ‘the primary basis for relief is a mistake of which the non-mis-
taken party has constructive notice’, the main inquiry is whether there is unconscionable
behaviour sufficient to invoke the court’s equitable jurisdiction.31
Finally, while Lord Mance took the view that there was no constructive notice in the
present case, he opined that in order for constructive notice to have its ‘relevant role’ in
Singapore law,32 unconscionability could not be merely limited to knowledge of the
mistake – it must also encompass behaviour in ‘seeking to retain the benefit of the
mistake once it [was] discovered’.33 This is because, according to Lord Mance, the
underlying rationale behind the doctrine of unilateral mistake was not a lack of corre-
spondence between offer and acceptance but a principle of justice.34 However, given
that constructive notice depended on human involvement in the transaction, and
there was none in this case, the relevant inquiry should have been whether the Respon-
dent had actual knowledge of the error had the transactions been foreseen or if there had
been human involvement at the time, which would include knowledge of the error as
soon as it was discovered.35 Unconscionability was therefore only relevant in that it
would be unconscionable for the Respondent to retain the benefit of the transactions
once they came to know that it was the result of a major error.36
26 Quoine, [110].
27 Quoine, [204].
28 Quoine, [205].
29 Quoine, [204].
30 Quoine, [170].
31 Ibid.
32 Quoine, [173].
33 Ibid.
34 Quoine, [181].
35 Quoine, [204].
36 Quoine, [205].
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Taken cumulatively, the above points suggest that Lord Mance conceptualised
unconscionability, vis-à-vis the requirement of constructive notice, as the key inquiry
where unilateral mistake at equity is concerned in cases, such as the present one,
where constructive notice could not be shown.37 Being an equitable doctrine, the goal
was to ensure justice, and this demanded that the requirement of unconscionability
also included the behaviour of the non-mistaken party after the mistake was discovered.
CONCLUSION
Quoine demonstrates that existing common law principles may be sufficiently flexible to
tackle novel situations arising from the application of new technologies. But Quoine was
a case where the software involved could not develop its own responses to varying con-
ditions. Cases involving software that can adapt its own responses to varying conditions
(i.e. Artificial Intelligence), may necessitate changes to the doctrine of unilateral mistake
given that finding actual or constructive knowledge of the error may well be impossible
in such a situation. In that regard, the doctrine of unilateral mistake at equity, as con-
ceptualised by Lord Mance, may point us towards a viable answer.
37 See Chwee Kin Keong at [76]–[78] where the court took the view that constructive notice, vis-à-vis that of
unconscionability, was the key inquiry where unilateral mistake at equity was concerned. This is because
unconscionability could only be based on what the non-mistaken party knows.
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